The impressions one gets of the period 1780-1830 -generally regarded as the initial phase of industrial society -are becoming contradictory as the period is studied on an increasing number of levels. Before the railway age began (c. 1840) economic growth was not so significant and not diiefly a consequence of industrialisation 1 . Rostow's "great watershed in the life of modern societies (1782-1802)" is too bold a metaphore. England outstripped the European continent first of all by being the chief executor of the commercial revolution: "It was the network of world trade built up by eighteenth century British merchants that enabled Britain to take the lead in exploring the opportunities offered by innovations on both sides of the Atlantic" *. In their penetrating studies I m 1 a h and Matthews have pointed out that industrial products controlled the stream of trade to a smaller extent than has often been thoughtAnd moreover, as D e a η e and Cole remarked, all export was limited "by the restricted purchasing power of the British (colonial) customers" 4 . Considering all this, one should speak of refinement and improvement of the 18c trade system rather than of a new world of industrial production and free trade ') Abstract of British Historical Statistics, ed. B. R. Μ i t c h e 11 with the collaboration of Phyllis D e a η e, Cambridge 1962.
Politically speaking, the North American, French and Latin American revolutions seem signs of a new era ·. On second thoughts, however, these events -taking place in the shadow of the Holy Alliance -have little to do with the enlightened world of 18c economists and philosophers. From a historical point of view it is definitely incorrect of the sociologist S. M. L i ρ s e t to name the United States the First New Nation -a precursor of the age (after 1945) of world-wide independence and development 7 .
What prevails is rather that under the guise of (British) free trade and (French and American) republicanism the first contours of the nation as the focus of prosperity and power are beginning to manifest themselves e . Because of this contrast between concepts and reality the merchants were faced with special difficulties. A merchant realizes his profits on the road that leads from the manufacturer, planter or farmer to the consumer. In doing so he is dependent on the arrangements made in commercial policy, on the situation of the international payments system, on the visibility of markets and on the habits of the consumer. Big profits usually involve exceptional risks. But, when the relations between the markets depend on irregular communication such profits may also be due to chance, as was often the case c. 1825 ·. Apart from these factors, however, one should consider the merchant's cultural context. His actions are also determined by the extent to which commercial activities are appreciated and by the faith -or lack of faiththat a particular nation has in its own chances in world trade. A nation's worldview, which is part of its self-concept, and the role-model of the merchant-bankers are some more determinants in the behaviour of merchants. Before defining them -the primary object of this essayit will be necessary to determine how the merchant's position and the ideas about wealth and welfare had developed in the preceding period 10 .
II.
The merchant's position in traditional society is a marginal one. He is the man who keeps in touch with an outside world that is generally regarded as dangerous. In this situation it was possible for him to feel more closely related to cartographers and geographers than to religious and military castes. Now traditional society, too, is familiar with the discord "fear and desire" as regards the outside world. Therefore it does not seem improbable to suppose that increase in political power in relation to the outside world could lead to the merchant's incorporation into society
Thus it happened that clerical leaders (cf. the Middle Ages) or political rulers began to regard the merchants as advanced guards in territories that were to be conquered. Simultaneously the travelling merchant, like Marco Polo, could bring the latent discord "fear-desire" into the open by means of his travel stories. At that moment power -glorified as empire -could be more or less sanctioned by philosophers and merdiants. Already at an early date, therefore, the merchant came under the influence of the dualism of economic and political reality and the dangerous dreams of peaceable, happy and wealthy peoples.
For medieval man life was based on the trias legend, myth, and reality. As once Athens had been threatened and challenged by Atlantis, in the same way Christianity now had to face the Arab world. The Saracens held Jerusalem, the sanctifying centre of the world. They sealed off the approaches to Cathay, Zipangu and the Indies. In this inaccessible outside world Prester John was an ally, wisely controlling the fountains of youth, the purity of Christianity, and rivers full of precious jewels and gold in Ethiopia ll . Legend has it that in the 6th and 8th centuries St. Brendan and Iberian bishops had also wandered out over the Atlantic waters. They had founded holy cities, places of refuge for the Christians who were threatened by the Saracens: "Cities secret, hidden, secure, delightful, separated from ordinary men"
The medieval legends offer us a view of the pre-conscious desires, which were blocked as temptations u . Late in the Middle Ages and in the early Renaissance these legends stood a fair chance of being realized owing to means so far unknown. The magic craving of the soul was grafted upon the secular reality of compass, luxury, sail and canon (Carlo Cipolla). How was it possible for this legend that is so characteristic of all human societies, to create reality: the European world .
First of all there was a Renaissance of free knowledge. But the crucial point is the secular development of Christianity. In that time the Iberian kings became crusaders of the Pope and also the executors of a revolution in cartography and navigation. The general need of a Utopia, the evolution of kingship and commercial development began to strengthen each other. The first conquistadores -like Cort£s -and the colonising monks -like Las Casas in Central America -were children of a new and secular Christianity 1β . In 16c. Spain a dream of untouched wealth and exalted godliness -in such terms Columbus recorded his first impressions of Hispaniola -pervaded gold-seekers and monks. But the debate about the legitimacy of colonisation and about a humanizing colonial practice -Vitoria, Las Casas, Sepulveda, Cano -revealed that for Europe colonisation and conscience were inseparably linked. An expansive culture, which did not hesitate to secularize the parable of salvation by economic and political means, failed to solve the conflict of impulse and superego in itself 1β . Therefore, the ambivalence of traditional societies was strengthened. But what about the social position of the merchant-class? Thanks to the art of printing their voyages of discovery were admired everywhere. The kings regarded them as the pioneers who brought wealth into the country and increased its range of power. The merchants on the other hand, could do very well with the prerogatives from the state -the commercial companies with political sovereignty. It was from this joining of interests that mercantilism derived its reasonableness Thanks to their strategic talent European merdiants knew how to use the American precious metals as mediums of exchange for Asiatic spices, silk and tea. In the 18th century the sugar-plantations in the WestIndian islands, slave trade, and the tradingposts in North America which supplied wood, and corn, formed the basis of ensured prosperity. 17c and 18c mercantilism may be described as a warlike strategy in the economics of great merdiants and government officials. The hazards of sailing, the defectiveness of international transfer of payment and the competition of neighbouring nations made world commerce a hard struggle. But also a struggle from which Dutch merchants and the West India Interest derived their political power.
There were, however, antinomies on various levels such as the conflict of impulse and superego mentioned above. In the 18th century England and France became the scene of periodical European selfexamination. Clarkson's Abolition Society and the Amis de Noirs caused an aversion to slavery and slave-trade
1S
. The alliance between Empire and Commerce was rejected by Adam Smith as monopolistic. Besides it was regarded as an impediment to a full development of the colonies in the new world. R a y η a 1 whose Histoire Philosophique des Deux Indes ran to fifty-four new impressions in the period 1770-1800, regarded free trade among nations respecting each other as the great precursor of civilization. Predominant was the idea that as a politico-economical system mercantilism, both at home and abroad, was incompatible with progress and humanity. The Wealth of Nations and the Histoire Philo- To that end the Bon Sauvage had to be defined, just as his most deterrent persecutor. Already in the 17th century the· Northern Europeans had read Las Casas* violent attack on the destruction of the Indian people. In the conflict between politics and religion he had become the diief witness for the prosecution in the black legend. The West-European nations had come to the conviction that the superstitious and tyrannical Spanish Crown was prematurely exhausting the native population and exploiting the riches of South America purely for its own benefit. The black legend was an expression of the WestEuropean sense of superiority with regard to Spain and its colonial activities. Latin America with its peculiar wealth, sickened by Spanish maladministration, became the new Atlantis so . It seemed the primary object for a humanizing policy of the enlightened merchants from Northern Europe. No longer frustrated by the egotistic policy of the mercantile class, an independent Latin American world (Tucker) could become a "never failing market" (Times 1806) with brilliant prospects of trade -as pointed out by James Mill in the Edinburgh Review In this way the merchant got a new function in an ancient myth of wealth. His actions would cause the humanitarian preponderance of the North Atlantic area to radiate over other continents. The national mission seemed to be in line with international progress: elimination of Spain, symbolizing the tyrannical Middle Ages. The myth of wealth, nobility of heart and national power drove the North Atlantic merchants to never failing markets. But how did they execute their mission, when they had to find their way in the conflict between expectation and reality?
III.
With that purpose in mind it will be necessary for us first to determine in how far the ideas about free trade, industrial progress and republican freedom differed from the political and economic developments in the period 1780-1830 (IV-VII). Then we will have to ask ourselves in how far the merchants may have been misled by them. For merchants are not inclined to wait to execute their actions until they have studied the pattern of expectation and reality. Most things are found out by them, while they are working. And in general they are then inclined to adapt themselves quickly. For from years of practise they know that political and economic prognoses are of relative worth.
The answer to the question to what extent they were misled, could also be obtained by historical description. But in that case the problem is that it will not be possible to explain, for instance, the differences between the various nations. It seems necessary to insert some theory defining in a few hypotheses the connection between circumstances and behaviour (VIII-X). Only then will we be able to describe the merchants' pattern of reaction and to try and explain why they acted as they did (XI-XIII).
IV.
Recently a study appeared about this period, challenging the picture of undisturbed progress: War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830
S1
. Remarkable in this period is the emancipation of the group of professional people, manufacturers, civil servants and journalists, moving around the social barrier of upper and middle classes. They used the new worldwide vocabulary of enlightenment to strengthen their position in national society. Freedom first of all meant acting more energetically, which led to a more comprehensive set of tasks for the authorities. Conflicts and aspirations that could not be controlled by the social mechanism were put in the hands of the authorities, who
") The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IX, ed. by C. W. C r a w I e y, Cambridge 1965. symbolized the nation. In the Rhineland patriotism -as we find it with the Elberfeld merchant Jakob Aders, founder of the Rhenish-West India Company -came to denote a national attitude in favour of the nation's own economic development. Exemplary were the activities of List, who moulded the emancipation of continental Europe into form by means of his national System in order to counter-balance the cosmopolitan urge for action of Adam Smith's Great Britain 22 .
It is understandable, therefore, that in the United States -after the flush of Independence had passed -Hamilton and Washington laid stress on autarchy and political neutrality. North American Independence meant a serious interference with the exclusive relationship between England and "His Majesty's most opulent Sources" in the West Indies. The North American merdiants -the Dutchmen of America -wandered to the Caribbean area, which was to American politicians the most natural outlet for their manifest destiny. In 1803 the French author Volney spoke of "la direction naturelle et progressive de leur ambition vers l'archipel des Antilles". The Caribbean Area -and especially Cuba (1823) -became the disputed entrance to the riches of the new world. The Monroe doctrine was first of all a Caribbean charter. In its foreign policy the United States focused its mixture of providential blessings, hankering after expansion -the socalled "destiny" -and commercial interests on the Floridas, Cuba, the Caribbean Area and after 1840, on Texas and California 28 .
The modernization of the Dutdi nation took place under a new constellation. After 1780 Dutch economists and political leaders discussed the decline of prosperity both at home and in the colonies. The middle classes -organized in the Oeconomische Tak -tried to emancipate themselves from the regents. They wanted to differentiate the economic structure of the country. They aimed at a centralized form of government with an active welfare policy. In colonial affairs they were critical of the traditional policy of the privileged companies in East and West. The debates in the National Assembly -under Frendi guardianship -were only to a certain extent characterized by the humanitarian anxiety about the lot of the "natives", which was a central theme for English abolitionists and French philosophers.
King William I (1813-1841) supported the "patriotic" idea of Dutch welfare. Under his leadership an enlightened form of despotic government was carried through in the home country and in the colonies. In the East the liberal colonial policy failed and was transformed by a national pacte colonial which concentrated on maximizing the revenues of the DutA treasury
In the home country the King constructed a mitigated free trade policy to control the diversity of interests among his subjects, who were partly commercially -the old Dutch regentsand partly industrially minded -the middle classes, especially those in the Belgian provinces. The Netherlands Trading Company, founded in 1824 as a central agency for industry and commerce, was to give manufacturers and merchants national support and protection to survive in world trade. In his foreign policy towards Latin America, the King followed from 1822 the course taken by England. He tried to let the colonies in the West play a part -Curasao free port in 1826 -in the trade to Latin America. William I tried to sail between the Scylla and Charibdis of international power-politics. Till 1830 the fear of Spain and the Holy Alliance remained an essential element in Dutch politics, just as it did in the politics of Prussia for instance. The Netherlands never tried to play the role of political mediator, though that might have been expected on the ground of its enlightened ideals, the old tradition of Holland as a centre of peace and free trade and on the ground of well-understood self-interest. In the Netherlands, too, the main emphasis was laid on short-term consideration of power Great Britain came closest to the image that Raynal and Smith had of world commerce. In this connection, however, it should not be forgotten that after 1815 England's position of power on the oceans was almost undisputed. But when that is left out of consideration it appears that in the foreign policy of Great Britain, too, the old ideas are still there. England built on her 18c relations: on the basis of political neutrality, formulated in Castlereagh's memorandum (1807), as many keypoints as possible were founded: colonies of traders, doctors, teachers, tailors, shoemakers, saddlers and innkeepers (Humphreys). Economically, Latin America should be free: an open market. Therefore political independence of Latin American countries ought to be attended by economic accessibility. England acted as mediator, when there were conflicts both with the motherland and among the young states themselves, as it did successfully in the case om Uruguay. This role of guardian increased England's credit with the new nations. But for Canning this was a consequence of his conviction that to redress the balance of the old world he had to call into existence a new one. Besides, the English didn't forget to defend their Caribbean positions as commercial depots for trade to the coastal regions of the Spanish Main and Central America te .
V.
The history of the Caribbean islands during this period shows that conceptions and positions of authority considered as belonging to the past were still alive. The negro Republic of Toussaint Louverture fired the imagination of French revolutionists. But the deeds of violence assumed such great proportions that after 1802 the events in Sainte The problems of slave-trade and emancipation would be solved less quickly. The planters fought a fierce struggle against the abolitionists. As strongholds of the empire St. Thomas, Jamaica and Cuba got a new function in the trade to Latin America, which was to have been an example of free intercourse between nations respecting each other's dignity (Raynal). The saints only won their case after it had appeared that Cuba and Brazil, which gained in importance also as consuming markets for English manufacturers, undermined the English sugar-kingdoms in the West Indies se .
In Cuba the United States built up a strong position which was of importance for their carrying-trade. The island was the major stronghold in the protracted struggle with England for the Caribbean area w . Notable also was the recovery of Spanish trade to Cuba after 1825. The Spanish merchants withdrew large quantities of money from circulation and built up a new position of colonial authority from Cuba. The rapid rise of Cuba and Puerto Rico after 1815 as sugar producing islands was remarkable' 1 . After 1825 -when the card-house of high hopes concerning Latin America collapsed -the merchants changed over to the Caribbean islands, as the English did to Jamaica, the North Americans to Cuba and Sainte Domingue. The Dutch tried to re-activate Curasao, which delayed the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Gran Columbia. Bolivar distrusted the Curasao, merchants who remained pro-Spanish until 1830.
The Caribbean area remained the disputed entrance to the new world. Between 1823 and the Panama Conference in 1826 European nations, the United States and Latin America formed a triangle of power-relations around Cuba. France, Great Britain, the United States and the Independent States of Mexico and Gran Columbia tried to include the Spanish stronghold in their sphere of influence. The North Atlantic governments succeeded in dissuading Mexico and Gran Columbia from an invasion. England and the United States managed to prevent Spain from presenting the island to France in exchange for the help offered in restoring the unlimited power of Ferdinand VII, when in 1823 he had to face liberal-constitutional forces. England strove to maintain the status quo: Spain as a more or less tolerant governor of Cuba seemed more attractive than more direct power to the United States.
The central themes in the debates about the North American mission to the Panama Conference (1826) were Cuba and the American commercial system of Henry Clay, in which the United States were to protect their Southern brothers against the egotism of Europe. Washington's policy was suffused with a republican sauce by the most national angel of providence, John Quincy Adams. But Bolivar saw Great Britain as the guardian holding the needle of balance between Europe with its Holy Alliance and the new American scene. In one of his sorrowful moments he said: under the guise of freedom the United States have spread a lot of misery over the Latin American world. From the outset, therefore, the American union wrestled with the conflict between the views of North and South concerning the "destiny" of the American world. The ambiguity -between enlightened concepts and power-political reality -with regard to the Caribbean area was typical of the attitude of England, France and the United States to each other in their struggle for the riches of new Atlantis.
VI.
Before describing the diaracter of Latin American Independence, we should determine accurately in how far changes in the economic structure and the pattern of trade had altered the scene of action.
After 1780 in England the quick growth of the cotton and other industries led to the rise of a class of self-confident manufacturers. New consuming markets -outside the mercantile empire -were sought by these entrepreneurs. After 1783 they accepted the new trade ally, the United States. From that time onwards trade was concentrated on the North American routes: Hamburg, the English ports, the ports of Independent North America and the West Indies. From there the merdiants wandered to areas outside the 18c empires: Latin America, Japan, China M .
About 1790 world-trade was brought under a special regime in consequence of acts of war. This put an end to the favourable position in the Latin American market of French and German products, whidi were shipped via the Spanish ports. The modernization of industry in the Rhineland, around Li£ge, Verviers, Eupen, in Saxony and Switzerland partly came to a standstill. Under Napoleon the French and Belgian industries benefited from the extension of the continental market, but lost their grip on the territories outside Europe. English and American ships had full scope in the Caribbean area, Spanish America and Asia Si .
After 1813 English merchants experienced difficulties on the continent. The possibilities on the European market were limited by its shortness of hard currency, a result of its more innerdirected orientation through Napoleon's economic and administrative reconstruction and a result of the decline in the supply of gold and silver caused by political troubles in Mexico and Peru. Besides, until 1840 the insufficient connections, the tariff-walls and the preference for local products 
were regular trade barriers to the products manufactured in England
The merchants and manufacturers in Bordeaux, Havre, Antwerp, Li£ge, Verviers, the Rhineland, Elberf eld-Barmen and Saxony managed to recover and expand former positions. This was imperative because the increase of production then taking place -though more slowly than in England -had to be attended by new possibilities for selling. Therefore, Canning's statement -"I called the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old" -could also be applied to the economic discrepancy between production and consumption: the shareholders in Elberfeld, the entrepreneurs in Saxony (1831), the many companies in England, the arms manufacturers in Li£ge, the textile industries around Zürich and Verviers, and the carrying-traders in the seaports of the United States, all of them and still more people expected from Latin America the solution of their problems. But the commercial revolution in world traffic came about more quickly than the demand for colonial products grew. Prices were steadily falling. The profits were smaller than had been expected. Latin America could offer no solution for the growing production of the dominating nations in world trade **. What was the miscalculation in the case of the never failing markets in new Atlantis?
VII.
The first miscalculation was the extravagant notion people had of Spanish maladministration. The North Atlantic nations had little idea of the economic reconstruction which -under Charles III -had also been carried through in Latin America se . Because of this, moreover, people lacked insight in the specific consequences that the Enlighten- The Creoles fought for political recognition rather than independence. Besides, they laid less emphasis on commercial aspects. In politics they disliked business arithmetic as they particularly expected it from the United States. The latino-americanos strove for the retention of traditional structures and had little desire to disengage themselves from the past at any cost. What appealed to them was not the nation as a political autarchic reality, but rather their own town or territory, in which the development of an entire civilization was reflected In North America, there was at an early date a great suspicion of the Latin American contribution to revolutionary freedom. In 1806 John Adams declared that preaching democracy to birds and fish would be as successful as preaching it to Creole intellectuals. In the eyes of the North Atlantic nations Latin America undervalued the civilizing influence of the Northern mission of culture.
The idea of "New Atlantis", and the superior qualities of the North Atlantic nations together formed a positive self-concept that found affirmation in the economic development of England, Northern Europe and the United States. But, politically the self-concept of the two spheres of civilisation around Atlantis were different. And economically, Latin America remained a tropical colony in character without a large autochtonous group of merchants, ship-owners and manufacturers. Besides, one did not make enough allowance for the insufficient connections between the scarcely populated centres of the new world. On the whole, the population in the interior maintained a system of self-supply, which counted them out as consumers of European products. Prices of imported goods were in general determined by the declining value of tropical products. Moreover, part of the profits was lost because the value of Latin American currencies dropped steadily and sometimes precipitantly.
After 1825, when the cardhouse of high hopes collapsed, the black legend got a new function: explaining the disappointing economic development of Latin America. The bad qualities which in former centuries had been imputed to the Spanish masters now came to be considered as typical features of the behaviour of the Creoles. But how did these cultural concepts affect the activities and reflections of the group of merchant-bankers? Were there any important differences between the various North Atlantic communities?
VIII.
The North Atlantic nations were driven to new markets also in order to spread civilization: "Les peuples qui ont polt les autres ont ete commergants." And R a y η a 1 added to this: "Tout est Sange et doit (hanger encore." However, as we saw, information about the chances of profit in South America was deficient. This insufficient knowledge was made up for by injecting the merchants with myths of wealth, the black legend and by sending them out as pre-eminent pioneers. Raynal's successor, Ρ e u c h e t, said: "Le commerce s'essaie sttr des points ou il suivait precedemment, une routine consacree; la il espere, ailleurs il craint " ® 8 . To start their actions and to be able to digest the series of "success and failure" the merchant-bankers leant on the values, concepts and expectations of their own sphere of civilization.
By their expectations of profit the merchants also tested the concepts of their own culture. They struggled with the discrepancy between cultural and economic sets of values. In that way they became important agents in the process that leads to what Freud called: Realitäts-prüfung. Thus it becomes possible to find the determinants of the behaviour of merchants and also to describe and explain the specific course a nation takes, when, as missionaries, its merchants explore foreign cultures and markets. By what frame of theoretical relations can this process be analysed? 
M ) Μ. Ρ e u c h e t, Etats des Colonies et du Commerce des Europiens dans les

IX.
Concepts and values are never realized as foreseen by political and economic elites. But the same holds good for "cold facts": they never determine hope and distrust of the actors in the way cages determine the movements of birds.
The search for "self" and "reality" is a never ending quest. In science, we try to get a grip on reality by supposing its structure. Thus we study the political society as an organized power-structure; the wealth of nations and of groups as trade-patterns; economic development as an aggregate of capital, technology and labour; the social world as a system of positions, roles, barriers and institutions.
The introduction of the "self" into these "realities" is a logical consequence of the character of the human animal. Human beings have increased brain area devoted to seeing in contrast to other animals, whose brain favours the more primitive senses of smelling and hearing. Human beings are characterized by their self-concept which represents a -never ending and often failing -relationship with something beyond the self. The interrelation between self-concept and "otherdirected" actions (Riesman) must be analysed by concepts which tell us something about Self and Umwelt M .
. In the self-concept is contained a judgement of the self, which also elucidates the way in whidi the actor observes and experiences his situation. Besides, the self-concept includes an indication of the way in whidh the actor thinks he should act. He constructs his pattern of action in reference to the reaction expected from others. Therefore an analysis of the self-concept may throw some light on the situation of others: the other nation or distant civilization. Thirdly, hopes of an ideal situation are contained in the self-concept for instance, to bridge the unknown land between civilizations; and also basic fears to defend one's own destiny against dangers from the outer world 40 .
The position in society, the economic strength, and the degree of *·) Theodore CKahn, An Introduction to Hominology. The study of the whole man, Springfield 1969.
40 ) The Self in Social Interaction, ed. by Chad Gordon and Kenneth J. G e rgen, vol. I: Classic and Comparative Perspectives, New York 1968; Harold Proshansky and Peggy Newton, The Nature and Meaning of Negro SelfIdentity, in: Social Class, Race, and Psychological Development, ed. by Martin Deutsch, Irwin Κ a t ζ und Arthur R. Jensen, Englewood Cliffs 1968. power and communication can be taken as structural elements of the frame of reference. Cultural values can also have this function 41 . The self-concept -as an aggregate of self-estimation, criticism, judgement and Ideal-ego -offers an opportunity of analysing the process by whidi structural elements are internalised as motivations and attitudes. In many situations structural and institutional elements on the one hand and motivations and attitudes on the other influence each other permanently. Degree, character, and effect of this interplay can be discovered by analysing the changes in the self-reflection. For instance, if the 18c change in the politico-economic situation didn't affect the self-concept of Dutch merchants and politicians, one must conclude that they were losing their grip on reality. If British manufacturers, trade-unions, civil and social services are struggling with the present economic discrepancies, the self-concept will help in answering the question whether this process will take some decades or more. For the degree of flexibility of the self-concept is an important factor in restructuring the balance between traditional values and the present condition. Thirdly, if Americans are struggling with world chaos one has to consider not only strategic potentials and world-opinion but first of all the national self-concept, whidi may give us an idea of America's role in shaping the world. If -without realizing it -Americans are experiencing world affairs as an act in an American drama, one has to study the basic characteristics of the national self-concept: the manifest destiny, America as the First New Nation, America as the providential messenger of democracy **.
X.
The self-concept plays an essential part in the orientation beforehand and the evaluation afterwards. The nature of the self-concept -depressed, cheerful, explorative, resigned -determines to a large extent a group's or nation's adjustment to changing circumstances. Generally speaking, three kinds of self-concept may be distinguished: a) a self-concept of an explorative and resilient nature, resulting in an optimum use of possibilities; b) a self-concept that is naive and arrogant and may be the consequence of a long period of undisputed power. Keynes e.g. wrote about the England of 1914: "The inhabitant of London could proceed abroad to foreign quarters without knowledge of their religion, language or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, and would consider himself greatly aggrieved at the least interference. But, most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain and permanent... and any deviation of it as aberrant, scandalous and avoidable" 4S . In his study Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy Svennilson therefore concluded: "It should be kept in mind that after the war these outlooks and attitudes affected the ability of the business world to adjust itself to new economic trends" c) a self-concept of a dramatic nature, which finds expression in an overcompensated or negativistic attitude, so that every action is checked. In times of crisis the part that the self-concept plays seems to be more important and autonomous. As a matter of fact, however, it is always there, though its influence can only be determined accurately, if a long term development is studied. Especially comparative and long term research is necessary to distinguish between the parts played by a), b) and c) and to detach them from the influence of structural factors.
XI.
The preceding paragraphs show indirectly -concept of Atlantis, the black legend, the welfare economics as visualized by Adam Smithhow the self-concept works. Some examples may make it clear how for the period under discussion these general ideas affected the mentality and behaviour of North Atlantic commercial agents, consuls, merchants, military adventurers and pre-ethnological writers. Then follows an analysis of the Dutch self-concept and that of the Rhineland Company. Both societies were structurally rather similar, but there were marked differences in their attitudes and reactions to independent South America.
The theme of wealth is found on almost every page of G. A. Thompson's adaptation of Alcedo's Dictionary (1815) 45 .
With these and other books in hand consuls and merchants observed new Atlantis. O'Reilly, English consul in Guatemala, wrote in 1825: "The germs of wealth and greatness exist here." Robert Sutherland, English consul in Maracaibo gave his commentary like a new Columbus: "The earth is so fertile, that if turned up with a needle, it will yield a crop" *·. Especially after 1825 disillusion followed and was sublimated in the superhistoric framework of the black legend. The North American consul, Lowry at Caracas, stated: "This people is ill prepared for the Rights of Civil Liberty and the leaven of Spanish despotism has infected their present Rulers as mudi as it did their former masters" 47 . And as John Quincy Adams complained in 1821 there was no inclination "to take any political lessons from us" 4e . In 1826 a North American merchant in La Gueira was disappointed with Bolivar -"who lacks entirely all fitness for business whidi he detests" -and about the Creole leaders who "have not learned justice and knew not the meaning of republicanism" 4 *. So the merchants did not only have to struggle with the political and economical insecurities of a disrupted market. They also tripped over their own virtues. As they more fully identified their personal security with the local situation, they became less objective in their observations and more powerless against the competition of other merchants. Therefore, the great merchants of strong nations did not always survive in this disrupted market. Especially the merchant-bankers and carryingtraders of England and the United States overestimated their own superiority in the never failing markets. They underestimated the Rhenish West India Company, the Frendi merchants and also the Prussian Seehandlung, which succeeded in expanding their relative shares in the trade with Vera Cruz, Cuba, Rio de la Plata, Valparaiso, and Lima. These merchants did not fear for their power on the part of the Latin American nations. And besides, they were conditioned for a intuitive understanding of the market, because competition with the English exporters was a hard struggle. They remained convinced of the chances for the small groups of merchants from continental Europe i0 .
In letters to friends Jakob Aders, the founder of the Rhenish West India Company, fulminated against the over-importance that was attached "an die Überlegenheit der Englischen Industrie". In 1821 he founded the above mentioned company with Becher and Holzsdiue from Hamburg. He rejected speculative actions and aimed at "gesidierten Absatz gegen baares Geld, mit mäszigen Nützen". Until 1826, when Aders died, the results were reasonable in every respect. By that time there had been shipments for a total amount of four million Thaler n . For the German Mining Association -also from Elberfeld - . The merchants, mining experts, doctors and ethnologists were the basis for the German communities which after 1870 were to accomplish an important exchange of products and capital with Latin America.
To Dutch merchants, on the other hand, and government officials Latin America became a remote and corrupt continent. The Netherlands Trading Company -founded in 1824 by the King -was insufficiently supported by Dutch merchants. Furthermore the Company arrived too late and suffered too heavy losses in speculations in Pernambuco wood and cotton to be able to get a gradual and firm control of the relations with Latin America. In the coastal regions of the Caribbean area the Dutch merchants achieved much less than the German and French ones. In 1827 the Trading Company reverted to the pacte colonial with Java. These failures are the more interesting, because after 1825 Antwerp managed to organise an important market for colonial products from Brazil, Cuba, and Haiti. In this respect it was a formidable competitor for London, Liverpool and Hamburg. The Amsterdam merchants, however, were still unable to shake off their feelings of impotence and subordination M .
XII.
The three kinds of self-concept mentioned above all play & part in the case of Holland: the explorative and resilient one; the naive and arrogant one; and the dramatic one. The explorative kind is found in the activities of minister Falck, with the ambassador to the Panama conference Jan Verveer, a number of commercial agents of the Trading Company, Joh. van den Bosch -after 1830 governor of the East Indies -and with many consular agents. Naivety appears from the fact that until 1830 the King, the Amsterdam merchants, the Trading Company, and the government officials at home and abroad were influenced by the 17c idea of Holland as the centre of world trade. The dramatic kind is found in allusions to "the tragedy of the 18c defeat of the small Dutch nation in the midst of big and little scrupulous countries" **. It had provoked a mental complex: Holland as a poor nation. Especially Amsterdam claiming international privileges lay down under this 18c treatment with a great deal of self-pity.
The King had tried to realize the idea of a general staple-market by strengthening the group of manufacturers. This bold world-viewpartly distilled from the glorious era of Dutch carrying-trade in the 17c, partly the outcome of the emancipatory tendencies among the middle classes -collapsed when it came in contact with the reality of the postNapoleontic world. The government was seeking for conditionsAmsterdam as the centre of world-trade and Curasao as the centre of the Americas -which no longer existed. Especially in 1830 -namely by the secession of the Belgian subjects -the King became an isolated man surrounded by the Amsterdam community with its "Poor Holland"-complex
The Amsterdam community showed little understanding for the King's reconstruction policy. In 1830, not without malicious pleasure, the old Dutch community saw him trip over his territorial and industrial concept of "Dutch" welfare. The "Poor Holland"-complex was sublimated by welcoming the Belgian secession as the prelude to a new -and old -era: Holland as the general market in world trade in which Dutch merchants were supposed to have been of the most tolerant and innocent kind. G. K. van Hogendorp, symbol of the commercial groups opposing William I's broader concept of welfare, prophesied that world commerce would return to the funnel of the staple-market, now that free trade was to resume its ancient rights. Neither to him nor to his followers in Amsterdam was it clear that the Netherlands were in fact entering upon the darkest period in their history. In contrast to his lethargic nation the King accepted the failure of his concept -except in the case of the Belgian secession (1830-1839) .
The chances for Holland in world commerce were unfavourable. But more disastrous was the conflict between groups with different self-concepts. The naivety could be righted, but -for the time beingthe dramatization could not. The power of the psycho-dramatic selfconcept was one of the principal reasons why Amsterdam and Rotterdam did not recover their roles as agents in the trade between Great Britain and the German hinterland until 1860. Up to that moment the population lived on agriculture and the Indian possessions, which the King had saved from the mental depression.
XIII.
The analysis that is given here -and that is most significant concerning the nation into which the author could make the most extensive researches -may also be of value for an explanation of the relations between the United States and Latin America, England and the Atlantic community and of the position of continental Europe. I would like to give it the title of Triangle around Atlantis: the everchanging system of power-relations, economic activities, and national self-concepts. I hope that the hypotheses in this essay will convince the reader of the possibility to explain in this way questions which up till now receive the name of honour "paradox". Then it might appear that this combination of socio-psychological and structural approaches offers opportunities of prospection.
